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Toward a Housing Imperative and Other 
Reflections on 
Balanced Growth and Development 
John R. Nolon* 
A. Is There a Right to Housing? 
For a time it was fashionable among housing advocates to 
claim that all persons of whatever income had a fundamental 
right to decent housing. In 1974, Congress reaffirmed the na- 
tional housing goal of realizing a decent home for every Amer- 
ican family,' but a constitutional right to be housed, running 
to each citizen of the United States, has never been 
established. 
The purpose of the 1974 reaffirmation may have been to 
respond to Mr. Justice White who wrote in 1972: 
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and 
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide 
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are 
unable to perceive in that document any constitutional 
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality 
. . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of 
adequate housing . . . [is a] legislative, not judicial, func- 
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, J.D. University of Michigan 
Law School. Mr. Nolon is a member of the Section of Urban, State and Local Govern- 
ment Law of the American Bar Association. He has served as an advisor to the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and to the Presi- 
dent's Council on Development Choices in the 1980s. 
1. 42 U.S.C. 8 1441(a) (1982). Congress finds that the supply of the nation's 
housing is not increasing rapidly enough to meet the national housing goal, estab- 
lished in the Housing Act of 1949,42 U.S.C. $8 1441-14905 (1982), of the "realization 
as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for 
every American family." 42 U.S.C. 8 1441. Congress reafFirms this national housing 
goal and determines that it  can be substantially achieved within the next decade by 
the construction or rehabilitation of twenty-six million housing units, six million of 
these for low and moderate income families. 42 U.S.C. 8 1441(a). 
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In a series of recent cases, the New York courts have 
commented on the legislative acts of the state and local gov- 
ernments which have restricted or expanded the access to 
housing for limited income households or minorities. From 
these holdings, we can glimpse the outlines of a housing im- 
perative: an emerging right running generally to low and mod- 
erate income households and minorities not to be excluded 
from living in any given community. As important, there also 
emerges the understanding that our legislators are empowered 
to act decisively to solve New York's much-lamented housing 
p r ~ b l e m . ~  
B. Municipal Duty Not to Exclude or Discriminate 
The New York Court of Appeals boldly instructed us in 
these matters by declaring in 1975 that "in enacting a zoning 
ordinance, consideration must be given to regional needs and 
requirements . . . . There must be a balancing of the local de- 
sire to maintain the status quo within the community and the 
greater public interest that regional [housing] needs be met."' 
This view of the housing imperative was affirmed in 1987 
by the same court which stated: 
Implicit in our rulings is a recognition of the principle 
that a municipality may not legitimately exercise its zon- 
ing power to effectuate socioeconomic or racial discrimi- 
n a t i ~ n . ~  [Allthough we affirm the . . . [dismissal of the 
complaint] here, we note that today's decision [should 
2. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1971). Courts have also held that neither 
the federal nor state governments are under a statutory duty to construct low and 
moderate income housing. See, eg., Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1082 
(2d Cir. 1974); Citizen's Committee v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1071 (2d Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). 
3. REPORT OP THE GOVERNOR'S HOUSING TASK FORCE, HOUSING IN NEW YORK. 
BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE 7 (1988). 
4. Berenson v. New Caetle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,110,341 N.E.2d 236,242,38 N.Y.S.2d 
672, 681 (1975). 
5. Suffolk Hous. Serve. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 511 N.E.2d 
67, 69, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1987). 
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not] be read as revealing hostility to breaking down . . . 
zoning barriers that frustrate the deep human yearning of 
low-income and minority groups for decent housing they 
can afford in decent  surrounding^.^ 
In perhaps its most dramatic attack on exclusionary zon- 
ing in recent years, the New York Court of Appeals struck 
down the definition of "family" in the Town of Brookhaven's 
zoning ordinance.' In this case, five unrelated elderly women 
lived in a single-family house in a district zoned single-fam- 
i l ~ . ~  Brookhaven's ordinance defined "family" as a maximum 
of four unrelated adults living together as a unit, but had no 
numerical limit on the number of related persons who could 
live t ~ g e t h e r . ~  The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's 
ruling that the ordinance violated the due process clause of 
the state constit~tion.'~ 
Baer v. Town of Brookhaven is a logical extension of an 
earlier decision in which a numerical limit of two persons, 
sixty-two years of age or older, was held to violate the due 
process standard, where no comparable limit applied to re- 
lated individuals living together as a family unit.ll In McMinn 
v. Town of Oyster Bay, the court reasoned that such differen- 
tiation is not reasonably related to a legitimate zoning pur- 
pose and, therefore, violates the due process clause of the New 
York State Constit~tion.'~ 
Through these two decisions, New York's highest court 
affirms the standard by which ordinances which exclude non- 
traditional families and other special household groups will be 
measured. In determining who may and may not live in a 
6.  Id. at 131, 511 N.E.2d at 71, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 528-29 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
7. Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 
234 (1989). 
8. Id. at 943, 537 N.E.2d at 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 234. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 944,537 N.E.2d at 619,540 N.Y.S.2d at 235. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, 8 6. 
11. McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 551-52, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 
1244, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (1985). 
12. Id. at 549-52, 488 N.E.2d at 1243-44,498 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32. See N.Y. CONST. 
art. I, 0 6. 
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community, there must be a showing that such classifications 
are calculated to achieve legitimate public purposes. 
Additional evidence of this judicial trend has come to us 
recently from the federal courts, as well. In Town of Hunting- 
ton v. Huntington Branch, NAACP,lS the Supreme Court af- 
firmed a court of appeals ruling which invalidated a section of 
the town's zoning ordinance. The ordinance limited the con- 
struction of multifamily housing to designated urban renewal 
areas, where fifty-two percent of the residents were minorities 
in a town where ninety-five percent of the population was 
white." A not-for-profit developer applied to amend the ordi- 
nance to allow it to build subsidized multifamily housing 
outside the urban renewal district.16 After the town denied the 
application, the developer challenged the ordinance.16 
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on nar- 
row grounds, holding that the action of the town was repug- 
nant to federal law." The Court's opinion leaves open the 
standard that is to be used to determine what proof of dispa- 
rate impact on minorities is needed in federal cases. The hold- 
ing of the court of appeals had been explicit on this point, 
stating that a prima facie case had been established by the 
plaintiff. This was based on the de facto discriminatory im- 
pact of the ordinance, notwithstanding the town's claim that 
the ordinance was justified by the public purpose of 
redeveloping a deteriorated section of the community.lB 
C. Municipal Authority to Provide Housing and to Direct 
the Provision of Housing 
The New York courts have shown extraordinary defer- 
ence to localities which have used their land use authority for 
inclusionary purposes. Land use attorneys have grown accus- 
13. 668 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff 'd ,  488 
U.S. 15 (1988). 
14. 844 F.2d 926, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1988). 
15. Id. at 931-32. 
16. 668 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), af f 'd ,  488 
U.S. 15 (1988). 
17. 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
18. 844 F.2d at 933-42. 
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tomed to advising municipal clients that zoning may not spec- 
ify who owns, occupies, or builds under an ordinance. The 
New York Court of Appeals turned this notion on its ear in 
the context of an inclusionary housing ordinance in the case of 
Maldini u. Ambro,lB when it was called upon to review a 
Huntington retirement district ordinance which allowed the 
construction of multifamily residences for aged persons to be 
developed, owned, and operated by not-for-profit corpo- 
rations. 
The court sustained these provisions, noting that "age 
considerations are appropriately made if rationally related to 
the achievement of a proper governmental objective. Here . . . 
meeting the community shortage of suitable housing accom- 
modations for its population, including an important segment 
of that population with special needs, is such an ob jec t i~e ."~~ 
Extending this holding to cover the needs of lower income and 
minority households is logical in light of what we know about 
the resiliency of the police power to meet documented public 
needs. 
This tendency to defer to legislative judgments on these 
matters was evident in a 1988 New York Appellate Division 
case arising out of a related set of facts. In Kasper u. Town of 
B r o o k h a ~ e n , ~ ~  the second department sustained an accessory 
apartment ordinance which allowed only owner-occupants to 
apply for a permit to add an accessory living unit to existing 
homes in single-family districts. The court noted the legiti- 
macy of the town's objective of assisting residents of limited 
economic means,22 and ignored the claim of the plaintiff-in- 
vestor who challenged the ordinance as regulating the "user" 
and not the "use" of property.23 
The state legislature has been equally attentive to the 
matter of empowering cities, towns, and villages to act aggres- 
sively to provide housing for those financially unable to cause 
19. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975). 
20. Id.  at 487, 330 N.E.2d at 407, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 391. 
21. 142 A.D.2d 213, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621 (2d Dep't 1988). 
22. Id.  at 218, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 624. 
23. Id.  at 222-23, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27. 
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the private market to produce housing affordable to them. 
These local governments, in the interest of creating affordable 
housing, have been empowered, inter alia, to donate public 
land, abate real property taxes, issue bonds to provide low- 
cost mortgages, pay the costs of community buildings in sen- 
ior citizen projects, construct off-site improvements, and fully 
subsidize construction and operating costs in senior citizen 
and homeless housing  project^.^' 
D. The Power of County Government to Provide Housing 
for the Homeless 
The burgeoning number of homeless households in New 
York has created great pressure on the courts to define and 
delineate the authority of the state and municipal govern- 
ments to prevent homelessness and provide housing to the 
homeless. The state scheme for housing the homeless in New 
York is based on article seventeen of the state constitution 
which allows the legislature to authorize such of its subdivi- 
sions as it determines to provide for the "aid, care and sup- 
port of the needy."26 The state legislature has placed that re- 
sponsibility on county go~ernrnent .~~ 
With state and federal assistance, our counties pay in ex- 
cess of three thousand dollars per month for housing homeless 
families in temporary sheltersaa7 In 1975, the New York Court 
of Appeals found that counties have a "duty" under state law 
to provide assistance to destitute persons which may not be 
avoided by claims that state and federal reimbursement pro- 
grams are insufficient to pay the costs associated with that 
24. See Nolon, Shuttering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of 
Local Government to Create Affordable Housing, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383, 405-15 
(1989). 
25. See N.Y. CONST. art. X m ,  § 1. "In New York State, the provision for assis- 
tance to the needy is not a matter of legislative grace; rather, it is specifically man- 
dated by our Constitution." Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 
N.Y.S.2d 728. 730 (1977). 
26. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW $3 61-62 (McKinney 1990). 
27. Westchester County, New York is currently paying one hundred dollars per 
night to homeless families in hotels and motels. Addressing the Problem of Home- 
lessness in Westchester County, A Pro Bono Report Provided by Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom and McKinsey & Company, Inc. 5 (March 29, 1990). 
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duty.ae 
As the pressures grow to meet the dramatic housing needs 
of the homeless, an important legal issue has emerged: What 
corresponding "powers" do counties have to discharge their 
duties in this arena? New York's Local Finance Law,ae makes 
it clear that the expenditure of county funds for these pur- 
poses is a legitimate exception to the constitutional prohibi- 
tion on giving or lending public funds for the benefit of pri- 
vate  individual^.^^ 
If the county's duty here is a governmental one, authoriz- 
ing the expenditure of general tax revenues, then can the 
county condemn land and use its funds to pay for that land 
and to construct housing for public assistance recipients? As a 
statutory scheme carried out under a discrete provision of the 
state constitution, would such an initiative preempt local zon- 
ing, allowing the county to build multifamily housing at any 
reasonable density? If cities, towns, and villages are vulnera- 
ble to such overriding action by counties, then does this duty 
fall, in some sort of derivative way, on them as well? 
E.  State Responsibility and Authority for Housing Special 
Population Groups 
The New York constitutional and statutory scheme im- 
poses duties for housing the homeless on the state and county 
governments. New York's Social Services Law has been con- 
strued by the New York Court of Appeals "as manifesting the 
Legislature's determination that family units should be kept 
together in a home-type setting and imposing a duty on the 
(State) Department of Social Services to' establish shelter al- 
lowances adequate for that purpose."s1 The plaintiffs in this 
28. Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 55, 332 N.E.2d 303, 310, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422, 
431 (1975). 
29. N.Y. Locm FIN. LAW § 101(b)(4) (McKinney 1990). 
30. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. No municipality "shall give or loan any money or 
property to or in aid of any individual . . . ." Id. 
31. Jiggeb v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 553 N.E.2d 570, 554 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1990) 
(interpreting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW 8 350 (l)(a) (McKinney 1983) and N.Y. COW. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, 5 352.3 (1987)). Having established the state's duty to desig- 
nate adequate shelter allowances, the court of appeals remanded the case for a trial 
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case claimed that the maximum shelter allowance of two hun- 
dred and fifteen dollars per month for a family of one, in- 
creasing to four hundred and twelve dollars per month for a 
family of eight or more, was not adequate to pay rents in the 
New York City market.sa 
In addition to this statutory duty, the state has the au- 
thority to preempt restrictive local zoning which frustrates the 
provision of state-sanctioned housing for other special popula- 
tion groups. The courts have invalidated local zoning ordi- 
nances which prevented the construction of a residential facil- 
ity for drug abusersss and local building restrictions which 
prevented the construction of a community residence for the 
mentally ill.s4' 
The state, pursuing similar and related purposes, has en- 
acted laws providing financial assistance to create housing op- 
portunities for the homeless and a broad range of other per- 
sons of moderate means.s5 Rather than leave its intent 
dependent upon judicial interpretation, could the state legis- 
lature act directly to amend each of its housing statutes to 
make it clear that projects assisted by the state preempt local 
on the factual issues. Jiggets, 75 N.Y.2d a t  415, 553 N.E.2d at  575, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 
93. 
32. Jiggets, 75 N.Y.2d a t  416, 553 N.E.2d a t  571, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 93. 
33. Town of Oyster Bay v. Syosset's Concern About Its Neighborhood (SCAN), 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6,1989, at  30, col. 2. The court concluded that the state legislature had 
intended to occupy and control the field of providing drug abuse facilities as a matter 
of state policy. See also People v. St. Agatha Home, 47 N.Y.2d 46, 389 N.E.2d 1098, 
416 N.Y.S.2d 577, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869 (1979); Unitarian Universalist Church v. 
Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1970). 
34. Community Resource Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. City 
of Yonkers, 140 Misc. 2d 1018, 532 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1988). 
The city's zoning was held to violate section 141.34 of the State Mental Hygiene Law 
because it was inconsistent with a state legislative scheme for providing for the men- 
tally ill. Id. a t  1022, 532 N.Y.S.2d at  335. 
35. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 41-43 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (making state 
grants available to eligible developers to provide housing to homeless persons of low 
income); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW 4614 (making state financing available to not-for- 
profit developers and to others to establish adult care residences for senior citizens); 
N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW $8 1001-1010 (McKmney Supp. 1990) (creating a grant 
program to finance rural preservation companies to facilitate housing for persons of 
low income); N.Y. PRN. HOUS. RN. LAW 1110-1113 (providing grants and loans to 
not-for-profit entities which use the funds to provide down payment grants to home- 
buyers who cannot afford unassisted private-market housing). 
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development regulations? In the face of a self-pronounced 
"crisis" in housing, is it incumbent on the state legislature to 
make it clear that projects assisted by the state preempt local 
development regulations? 
F .  An Emerging Housing Imperative 
The cases and statutes discussed previously, in the aggre- 
gate, define a rudimentary housing imperative by clarifying 
that state, county, and local governments have far-reaching 
authority to respond to individual housing needs. This realiza- 
tion gives greater meaning to a 1972 mandate of the court of 
appeals: "What we will not countenance, then, under any 
guise, is community efforts at immunization and excl~sion."~~ 
This analysis removes any doubt that our legislators have 
the ability, should they choose to use it, to insure that the 
state's collective housing supply is shaped to provide for all its 
citizens. In future discussions regarding housing problems, the 
electorate should countenance no disclaimers by public offi- 
cials that they lack the requisite legal authority to act. This 
will force the debate into the realm of finances, politics, and 
social values where decisions whether to support housing pro- 
posals are made in actual practice. 
G. Balanced Growth and Development 
The topic raised by this discussion is a general one of 
much concern to land use decision makers. Do they have the 
authority to shape development to respond to urgent public 
needs? Can they influence land development so that it is bal- 
anced, equitable, economic, and environmentally sound? 
What limits have the courts, constitutions, and statutes im- 
posed on this authority? 
Several other articles in this volume address the legal 
constraints on public efforts to regulate private development 
in the public interest. How far can such regulations go with- 
out violating the takings clause of the federal or state consti- 
36. Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 
138, 152 (1972). 
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tutions? Can citizen's groups use multiple law suits to prevent 
development from occurring without fear of liability? Can 
land use regulators use innovative techniques, such as impos- 
ing impact fees on private' developments, to pay for the costs 
allegedly created by them? 
These subjects were addressed by distinguished speakers 
at a conference sponsored by the Pace Real Estate Law Soci- 
ety in November of 1989. Among the speakers were Professor 
Bernard V. Keenan, and attorneys Eric J. Lobenfeld and Eu- 
gene J. Morris who agreed to write articles for the Pace Envi- 
ronmental Law Review on these subjects. We thank them for 
helping us to search for creative responses to the limits and 
liabilities of land use regulation. 
As the task of creating and preserving livable communi- 
ties becomes ever more complex and urgent, attorneys have 
greater responsibility to inform public regulators and property 
owners of their reciprocal rights and responsibilities. The ten- 
sion reflected here between private and public interests in 
property is as old as the common law.s7 We are grateful to our 
authors for enhancing and informing this ongoing debate. 
37. Sic utere tuo ut alienurn non laedas, "Use your own property in such a man- 
ner as not to injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (3d ed. 1933) 
(citing 1 Comm. 306, reprinted in, GARLAND ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN 
ERA (1978); 5 Ex. 797, reprinted in, 155 Eng. Rep. 349 (1916); 9 Coke 59, reprinted 
in, V Coke's Reports (1826)). ' 
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